Your CI/CD Pipeline Has Access to Everything. But Should It?
Your CI/CD Pipeline Has Access to Everything. But Should It?
Developer pushes the code to GitHub repository. The CI/CD pipeline gets triggered automatically and then it tests, builds and deploys the application to the server. Nothing is done manually. People do not log into the production environment. This is one of the greatest benefits of DevOps today. People are able to automate routine actions and speed up their deployments and at the same time avoid possible errors. However, there is one thing that developers forget about:
What privileges does the pipeline have?
In order to deploy an application, it might need access to the cloud, servers, databases, container registry, API keys, and production environment. All in all, automation can turn into the significant threat for your infrastructure in case it has too many privileges. And this is the reason why securing CI/CD pipelines has become a critical aspect of DevSecOps.
1. Your Pipeline Is More Powerful Than You Think
When any developer think about application and its security, their main focus goes on authentication, database protection, API security, and user permissions. These are important, but the deployment process also deserves attention.
Consider a typical CI/CD workflow:
Developer → GitHub → CI/CD Pipeline → Build → Test → Production Server
For each of them, the pipeline will need specific permissions to do something. Among other things, it may need:
- To read source code from a repository.
- To install dependencies for the project.
- To build Docker containers.
- To push images to the container registry.
- To connect to the cloud infrastructure.
Obviously, different permissions imply different levels of access. But the issue emerges when teams assign permissions because of automation reasons. For instance, rather than granting pipeline access to deploy a particular application, they might share credentials that would give access to managing the whole cloud account.
Again, the pipeline operates fine, but its permissions exceed its needs by far. In case of exposing such credentials, consequences may be more serious. It should be like “Automation should be given enough permission to complete its work but not unlimited permission to control the entire environment.”
2. Hardcoded Secrets Become Vulnerabilities:
Storing secrets in source code is one of the major security issues encountered during development. In this case, a programmer would have to include an API key that will be used to enable interaction between the application and an external system in the code:
API_KEY = “your-secret-key”
The application works and hence the code is deployed to GitHub. The issue with this is that anyone who has access to the repository could potentially have access to the credential.
Private repositories still need to have their access managed carefully. It could end up being shared with more individuals than intended, accidentally go from private to public or even be accessed via breached accounts. CI/CD pipelines suffer from the same issue. Credentials, passwords, private keys and cloud tokens get stored in config files or are exposed in logs.
There is a better way.
For example:
- GitHub Actions Secrets.
- GitLab CI/CD Variables.
- HashiCorp Vault.
- Cloud provider secrets managers.
These mentioned tools helps to keep sensitive values apart from application code. However, storing secret or private things securely is the first step. Teams must also have the control of which workflows can access it, avoid printing in logs, and rotate credentials when necessary.
3. A Compromised Pipeline May Impact Production
Consider a practical scenario now. The organization employs GitHub Actions for the automatic deployment of the app. With every push to the master branch, the flow deploys the app to the production environment. This is only made possible by the access the flow has to cloud deployment credentials.
Now suppose that the attacker manages to gain access to the developer’s account or the dependency employed for building the flow. In such a scenario, the attacker might have the ability to make modifications to the code or affect the flow. In case of a flow with elevated permissions, this could be used to:
- Deploy malicious application code.
- Access sensitive environment variables.
- Modify infrastructure.
- Push compromised container images.
- Access production services.
For this reason, the CI/CD pipeline should be regarded as one of the components of the security boundary of an organization. Securing the application without securing the process of its deployment leaves a huge vulnerability. A secured application can be compromised via an insecure pipeline.
4. Third-Party Dependencies Can Become an Entry Point
Modern development relies greatly on external packages and tools. For example, a React application may use more than a dozen npm packages. The creation of a Docker image may involve downloading of external images. The CI/CD pipeline itself may involve third-party GitHub Actions. Such practices save time, but they also imply certain trust. Let’s say a pipeline uses some third-party action for uploading build artifacts.
Despite its seeming harmlessness, this action gets executed within the automation process. If the action gets compromised or has any malicious code, it may potentially gain access to information available to the workflow. The same applies to the case with npm packages or other external dependencies. This is a component of the problem known as software supply chain security. Therefore, developers should :
- Make use of dependencies that are reliable and maintained.
- Check third-party workflow actions.
- Tie down critical actions to a particular version or commit hash.
- Delete unused packages.
- Secure your dependencies against vulnerabilities.
- Don’t give excessive permission to third-party tools.
What matters is that security is not limited to the coding that you develop. There is also the issue of the software and dependencies involved in building and delivering that code.
5. Not Every Pipeline Should Have Production Access
An easy way to lower the risk of CI/CD is to keep the permissions in different environments separate. Think of a project that uses three different environments:
- Development
- Staging
- Production
Developers might need frequent deployment permissions for development and staging environments. But what about production? There are real users in this environment, and it could have sensitive data too. Any misstep in production could impact both users and business activities. Granting all workflows access to production creates risks of unintentional and unauthorized modifications.
Instead, developers should create separate permissions. One workflow can be set up to deploy to development without giving it access to production. Another workflow can do some checks before deploying the code. The production release might require an approved release, protected branch, or even an authorized deployment workflow. It does not mean that there will always be manual steps for releasing the code into production. It means that access to production should be done intentionally and under control. The idea is to prevent a routine development workflow from gaining the rights to change the infrastructure.
6. The Principle ofLeast Privilege
The principle of least privilege is one of the security principles that can be linked to secure CI/CD practices. It implies that a user, application or any automatic process should have minimum necessary rights to perform a certain task. For example, if the CI pipeline requires access rights only to push Docker images to the registry, it does not need permission to destroy cloud infrastructure and make some additional database changes. The same applies to workflow access rights. If the workflow is supposed to access information only from the repository, then it will not have permission to make some changes to it. This is how it is possible to limit the workflow permissions in GitHub Actions.
For example:
permissions:
contents: read
This configuration allows the workflow to read the content of the repository without giving any broader permissions automatically. If a particular job within a workflow requires any further access permissions, they can be given separately. The same approach is also applicable to cloud credentials. It is much better to avoid using one administrator account for all deployments and to create separate identity with limited permissions.
7. Short-Lived Credentials Are Safer Than Permanent Keys
Some of the traditional deployments involve the use of persistent credentials. The developer would generate the access key, store it within the CI/CD variables, and keep it active for months or even years. Such an arrangement is practical, but it raises security issues. In case of a leak, the adversary can continue using the access key until it is eventually discovered and revoked.
A more secure way to authenticate involves using short-lived credentials wherever it is possible. One such method is the usage of OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication for the interaction between GitHub Actions and supported cloud providers. Instead of keeping the cloud access key in the repository secrets, the workflow can be used to get temporary access credentials based on the trust between the identity.
The generated credentials will be restricted according to the trust policy and will be expired on their own. It helps to minimize the risks of using the persistent access keys. Nevertheless, the OIDC requires proper configuration. The cloud provider needs to be convinced that the specific repository, branch, environment, or workflow is authorized to request access.
8. How DevOps Teams Can Secure Their Pipelines
Protecting CI/CD does not mean making each deployment complex. What is needed is embedding security into the existing process. Some concrete measures that could be taken include:
Checking pipeline permissions: Check to see what repositories, servers, clouds, and environments each pipeline can access.
Securing secrets: Keeping credentials away from source code, configuration files, and build logs.
Least privilege: Grant each pipeline only those permissions it needs.
Environmental separation: Making sure production credentials are not shared between development and testing pipelines.
Securing dependencies: Checking third-party actions, packages, and container images prior to their use.
Using short-lived credentials whenever possible: Where this approach is viable, it would be preferable to use identity-based access rather than access keys.
Protecting production deployments: Using branch protection, approval policies, and environment restrictions where needed.
Monitoring pipeline activities: Recording any unusual pipeline execution, permission modification, and deployment activities.
This set of actions reduces the risks of unauthorized access while preserving the advantages of automation.
9. Security Should Be Part of Automation From the Beginning
One of the major mistake that some teams make is thinking that security can be added to the process only once development and deployment has been done. They set up pipeline, connect production servers, set up credentials, and then just implement automation. Once they face any security issues, they begin investigating permissions and access control issues.
This can be a wrong choice because changes related to security introduced at this stage will likely lead to numerous changes to existing workflows. It is much better to think about security while designing a pipeline.
There are just a few questions that one should ask themselves:
- What resources do we need for our workflow?
- Who can trigger this workflow?
- What credentials are allowed for use here?
- Is this pipeline able to deploy to production?
- What if one of the dependencies is hacked?
- Are we able to track down any suspicious activities?
As you can see, the answer to these questions does not mean implementing a highly sophisticated security system. They just allow us to figure out the boundaries within which our automation works.
Final Thoughts: Automate Everything, But Trust Carefully
CI/CD pipelines have revolutionized software delivery. The ability to test your code, build the application, and deploy changes requires much less manual work than before. For today’s development teams, automation has become a necessity in most cases. But automation introduces new challenges. A pipeline capable of deploying the application, accessing cloud services, and managing production infrastructure becomes a very powerful instrument. In case this power is not managed, the pipeline itself becomes a security risk. The idea is not to avoid automation and complicate deployments.
The plan is to ensure that all of your automated actions are authorized, credentials or passwords are managed with security, and all the steps take place within the specified limits. A good CI/CD pipeline delivers code fast and efficient. While a great one delivers code securely.
“Because the biggest security risk in your deployment process might not be the application you’re deploying. It might be the pipeline that has permission to deploy it.”
Written by: Reeshaiel Shah